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Abstract
We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative
games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the
propensity of other players to participate to the game.
We display several algorithms that show that the problem is often
tractable for so-called network centrality games and influence attribution
games, as well as an example when optimal manipulation is intractable,
even though computing power indices is feasible.
Keywords: coalitional games, reliability extension,Shapley value, manipu-
lation.
1 Introduction
Control is a fundamental but difficult issue in multi-agent systems. A multi-
agent society may be difficult to control due to the concurrence of several factors,
that may interact and drive the dynamics in complex, unpredictable ways. Some
of these factors could include uncertainty about agent involvement [1], coalition
formation [2], the rules [3], the environment [4], about rewards [5], the presence
(or lack) of synergies between players [6], etc.
A common type of control is manipulation1, which often aims to change the
power (index) of a given player by means of interventions in the settings or the
dynamics of the agent society. Many types of manipulation have been considered
∗corresponding author. Email: gabrielistrate@acm.org
1We use the word with its wider, commonsense meaning, rather than the specialized one
from voting theory [7]. Our usage encompasses both strategic behavior by an agent or coalition
(voting theory ”manipulation”) and interventions by a chair or outside agent (such as control
and bribery in voting [8]). We assume, however, that all such interventions are costly.
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in the literature, often in a computational social choice context. They include
identity [9], cloning [10] and quota [11] manipulation in voting games, collusion
and mergers [12], sybil attacks [13] and, finally, multi-mode attacks [14], just to
name a few.
We contribute to this direction by studying yet another natural mechanism
for manipulation: changing the propensity of players to participate to
the game. This type of manipulation is quite frequent in real-life situations,
a central example being voting - while parties cannot control with absolute
certainty voter turnout on election day, they may employ tactics that aim to
mobilize their supporters and deter participation of their opponents’ voters2.
Manipulation could be performed by a centralized actor (like in the voting ex-
ample), or by a coalition of players [17], strategically modifying their behavior
(in our case their reliabilities) in response to a perceived dominance of a player
whose power index they wish to decrease.
The main impetus for our work was [18], where a model of strategic manipu-
lation of player reliabilities was first investigated. Bachrach et al. [18] considered
max games. In these games each player possesses a weight; the value of a coali-
tion is the maximum weight of a component of the coalition. They proved a ”no
sabotage theorem” for (the reliability extension of) max-games with a common
failure probability. They remarked that manipulating player reliabilities can
be studied in principle for all coalitional games, and asked for further investi-
gations of this problem, in settings similar to the one we consider, i.e. under
costly player manipulation. Given the negative results for max-games [18] and
the fact that computing power indices is often intractable [19], we concentrate
mostly on proving positive results, showing that there exist natural scenarios
where optimal attacks on power indices by manipulating players’ reliabilities
are easy to compute (and interesting). We hope that these positive results will
encourage renewed interest (and research) on the scope and limits of reliability
manipulation.
Contributions and outline In Section 2 we begin by informally stating the
problem and justifying our choice of the two classes of coalitional games studied
in this paper: network centrality games [20, 21, 22, 23] and credit attribution
games [24, 25]. Even though credit attribution games may seem to be some-
what exotic/of limited use, their importance extends well-beyond scientometry:
they were, in fact, anticipated, as hypergraph games (see [19] Section 3). The
two games we consider from this class, full credit and full obligation games, are
natural examples of read-once marginal contribution (MC) nets [26]. Full credit
games are equivalent to the subclass of basic MC-nets [27] whose rules are con-
junctions of positive variables ; full obligation games correspond to generalized
MC-nets whose rules consist of disjunctions of positive variables. Full obligation
games can simulate induced subgraph games [19]. Full credit games capture an
important subclass of coalitional skill games (CSG) [28, 29], that of CSG games
with tasks consisting of a single skill.
2Such scenarios are best modeled as multichoice voting games [15]. However, since such
games are multi-cooperative (rather than cooperative) games [16], they fall outside of the
scope of the present work, and will be dealt with in a subsequent paper.
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Section 3 contains technical details and precise specifications of the models
we investigate. We deal with two types of attacks: (node) removal, where we
are allowed to remove (decrease to zero the reliability of) certain nodes, and
fractional attacks, where reliability probabilities can be altered continuously.
In Section 4 we give closed-form formulas for the Shapley values of the
reliability extensions of network centrality and credit allocation games. Next we
particularize these results to centrality games on specific network: first we show
that no removal attack is beneficial; as for fractional attacks, we show that in the
complete graph Kn or when attacking the center of the star graph Sn, a greedy
approach works: one should increase the reliabilities of neighbors of the attacked
node, in descending order of baseline reliabilities. When attacking a non-center
player in Sn the result is similar, with the important exception that increasing
the reliability of the center should precede all other moves. In contrast, the
situation for the cycle graph Cn is more complex, involving all distance-two
neighbors of the attacked node. A simple characterization is provided for the
optimum as the best of four fixed “greedy” solutions. This characterization allows
the determination of the optimum for all combinations of reliability values and
budget.3 An interesting, and unintuitive, qualitative feature of the result is
that in the optimal attack a non-neighbor of the attacked node could be targeted
before some of the direct neighbors of the attacked node.
In Section 6 we analyze full credit and full obligation games. Although these
two games have the same Shapley value [25], we show that they behave very
differently with respect to attacks : removal attacks are not beneficial for full
credit games, NP-hard for full obligation games. Fractional attacks also behave
differently, modifying probabilities in opposite directions. In a particular setting
which includes the case of induced subgraph games we obtain greedy algorithms
for both games, derived from expressing the problems as fractional knapsack
problems. The determining quantities for the attack orders are (two different)
cost-benefit measures.
2 Problem Statement and Choice of Games
The power index attack problem, the main problem of interest in this paper, has
the following simple informal statement: we consider the reliability extension
of a cooperative game. We are given a positive budget B > 0 and are allowed
to modify reliabilities of all nodes, other than the targeted player x, as long as
the total cost incurred is at most B. Which nodes should we target, and how
should we change their reliabilities, in order to decrease as much as possible the
Shapley value of node x?
A variant of the previous problem, called the pairwise power index attack
problem and motivated by Example 1 below, is the following: we are given not
one but two players x, y. The goal is to decrease as much (within the budget)
the Shapley value of x, while not affecting at all the Shapley value of y. This
3The precise formula for the optimum is cumbersome, hence deferred to the full version.
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restriction makes some nodes exempt from attacks: we are not allowed to change
the reliabilities of players who contribute to the Shapley value of y.
Choice of games The problems described above could be investigated in all
classes of TU-cooperative games, or compact representation frameworks. How-
ever, we feel that the most compelling cases are those where the computation
of power indices, e.g. the Shapley value, of (the reliability extensions) of our
games is tractable4. In other words the intractability of manipulating a power
index should not be a consequence of our inability to compute these indices. In
particular, we are interested in scenarios where computing power indices is easy,
but computing an optimal attack on them is hard. Theorem 7 below provides
such an example.
The appeal of studying attacks on node centrality in social networks is quite
self-evident: game-theoretic concepts such as those considered in [20, 21, 22, 23]
formalize appealing notions of leadership in social situations. They have been
proposed as tools for identifying key actors, with applications e.g. to terrorist
networks [32, 33]. In such a setting, a direct (physical) attack on a leading node
may be infeasible. Instead, one could attempt to indirectly affect its status
(centrality), by incentivizing some of its peers.
Relevant examples of targeting nodes in order to affect power indices arose
(implicitly) in even earlier work [24], that attempted to develop coalitional mod-
els of credit allocation in scientific work. The following is a version of the ex-
ample in [24]:
Example 1. Two scientists A,B are compared with respect to their publication
record5. All their papers have exactly one co-author. Figure 1 displays this
information as a graph, listing for each author pair, the number of publications
they have authored and the number of citations. If using the Hirsch index, it
would seem that candidate A has a better track record than candidate B. But if
we discard publications both of them have co-written with “famous scientist Y ”
(that is, remove Y and its publications from consideration), then their
relative ranking would be reversed.
The authors of [24] attempted to use the Shapley value of a game based on the
Hirsch index for credit allocation. An ulterior, more general and cleaner game-
theoretic approach is [25]. The author defines several credit allocation games,
and uses their (identical) Shapley values as a measure of individual publication
record. Slightly modified versions of this measure have (regrettably) actually
been used in some countries to set minimum publication thresholds for access
and promotion to academic positions, e.g. the minimal standards in Romania.
In such a context one could naturally ask the following question: what are
the top k coauthors that account for most of a scientists’ publication record?
When using the game-theoretic framework for scientific credit from [25], this
is equivalent to finding the k coauthors whose removal (together with the joint
4This requirement disqualifies many natural candidate games such as weighted voting games
[19, 30], as well as most subclasses of coalitional skill games [31]
5We do not condone and caution against the real-life use of such crude quantitative metrics
for tasks like the one described in this example or our models.
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papers) causes the scientist’s’ Shapley value to decrease the most.
Collaborations may, however, be genuinely productive or just bring to one
of the scientists the benefits of association with leading scientists6. The Shap-
ley value approach of [25] does not distinguish between these two scenarios, as
it gives equal credit to all authors of a joint paper, irrespective of ”leadership
status”. Recent work, e.g. Hirsch’s alpha index [35], has attempted to quantify
”scientific leadership”. It is possible to define a measure based on the reliability
extension of credit allocation games that factors out the ”well connectedness”
of an individual from its score7. Given such a measure, the previous question,
that of finding the top-k co-authors is still interesting, as it identifies the most
(genuinely) fruitful collaborations of a given author, irrespective of status. This
is modeled by the power index attack problem in credit allocation games.
A Y B
X1 X2
X3
X4
X5 X6
P : 5
C : 4
P : 8
C : 8
P : 5
C : 4
P : 5
C : 3
P : 5
C : 3
P : 5
C : 4
P : 5
C : 3
P : 5
C : 3
Figure 1: The scenario (from [24]) in Example 1
3 Technical Details
We will be working in the framework of Algorithmic Cooperative Game Theory,
see [36] for a readable introduction.
We will make use of notation f |ba as a shorthand for f(b)−f(a). Given graph
G = (V,E) and vertex v ∈ V , we will denote by N(v) the set of neighbors of V
and by N̂(v) = {v} ∪N(v). Given S ⊆ V , we denote by δ(S) the set of nodes
y ∈ V \ S such that there exists x ∈ S, (x, y) ∈ E. We generalize the setting
above to the case when G is a weighted graph, i.e. there exists a weight function
w : E → R+. Given set S ⊆ V and integer r ≥ 1 we define Bw(S, r), the ball of
radius r around S, to be the setBw(S, r) = {x ∈ V : (∃y ∈ S) s.t. dw(x, y) ≤ r}.
6One could argue, of course, that such an association itself reflects positively on the scien-
tist. But the opposite argument, that prestige drives scientific inequality, has recently been
substantiated by real data [34] and is, at the very least, hard to ignore.
7The measure computes appropriate values of reliability probabilities, the lower the prob-
ability the more of a ”scientific leader” a coauthor is; we are currently investigating the
practicality of such an approach.
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We may omit w from this notation when it is simply the graph distance in G.
Also, given ”cutoff” distance dcut we define Ncut(x) = B({x}, dcut).
We will deal with cooperative games with transferable utility, that is pairs
Γ = (N, v) where N is a set of players and v : P(S) → R+ is a value function
under the partial sets of S. If S ⊆ N is a set of players, v(S) is the value that
players in coalition S can guarantee for themselves irrespective of the other
players’ participation.
Although we could prove similar results for other power indices, e.g. the
Banzhaf value, in this paper we restrict ourselves to the Shapley value. This
index measures the portion of the grand coalition value v(N) that a given player
x ∈ N could fairly request for itself. It has the formula [36] Sh[v](x) = 1
n! ·∑
π∈Sn
[v(Sxπ ∪ {x})− v(S
x
π)], where S
x
π = {π[i]|π[i] precedes x in π} and Sn is
the set of permutation.
We are concerned with two classes of cooperative games. The first one arose
from efforts to define game-theoretic notions of network centrality [20, 21, 22, 23].
We define these games as follows:
- Game ΓNC1 is specified by its value function vNC1(S) = |S ∪ δ(S)|.
- Given integer k ≥ 1, game ΓNC2 is specified by its value function vNC2(S) =
|S ∪ {x 6∈ S s.t. |N(x) ∩ S| ≥ k}|.
- In game ΓNC3 graph G is weighted. We are also given a positive ”cutoff
distance” dcut. We give the characteristic function vNC3 by vNC3(S) =
|B(S, dcut)|.
A second class of games, related to the example in [24] is that of influence-
attribution games, formally defined by Karpov [25]. A credit-attribution game
is formalized by a set of authors N = {1, ..., n} and a set of publications P =
{P1, ..., Pm}. Each paper Pj is naturally endowed with a set of authors Authj ⊆
N and a quality score wj ∈ R+. In real-life scenarios the quality measure could
be 1 (i.e. we simply count papers), a score based on the ranking of the venue
the paper was published in, the number of its citations, or even some iterative,
PageRank-like variant of the above measures.
- The full credit game ΓFC is specified by its value function vFC(S) which is
simply the sum of weights of papers whose authors’ list contains at least
one member from S.
- The full obligation game ΓFO is specified by its value function vFO(S)
which is the sum of weights of papers whose authors are all members
of S.
Denote by Papx the set of papers of x, and by CA(x) the set of co-authors of
x, i.e. the set of players l for which there exists a k ∈ Papx∩Papl. If l ∈ CA(x)
denote by C(x, l) =
∑
k∈Papx∩Papl
wk the joint contribution of x, l.
Reliability extension and attack models We will be working within
the framework of reliability extension of games, first defined in [1] and further
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investigated in [18]. The reliability extension of cooperative game G = (N, v)
with parameters (p1, p2, . . . , pn) is the cooperative game Γ = (N, v) with v(S) =∑
T⊆S
v(T ) ·ΠT,S , where ΠT,S = (
∏
i∈T
pi) · (
∏
i∈S\T
(1− pi)).
A useful result about these quantities is:
Claim 1. Let S ⊆W . We have
∂ΠS,W
∂pj
=


ΠS\j,W\j if j ∈ S,
−ΠS,W\j if j ∈ W \ S, and
0, if j 6∈ W
We will consider in the sequel the following two attack models:
(1). fractional attack: In this type of attack every node j different from the
attacked node x has a baseline reliability p∗j ∈ (0, 1]. We are allowed to
manipulate the reliability of each such node j 6= x by changing it from
p∗j to an arbitrary value p. To do so we will incur, however, a cost uj(p).
We assume that cost function uj(·) is defined and has an unique zero8
at p = p∗j , is decreasing and linear on [0, p
∗
j ] and increasing and linear
on [p∗j , 1] (Figure 2). That is: for every player j 6= x there exist values
Lj , Rj > 0 such that
uj(p) =


Lj(p
∗
j − p), if p < p
∗
j ,
0, if p = p∗i ,
Rj(p− p∗j ), if p > p
∗
j .
(2). removal attack: In this type of attack we are only allowed to change the
reliability of any node j (different from the targeted node x) from p∗j to
0. To do so will incur a cost cj .
A basis for fractional attacks The following simple result will be used to
analyze fractional attacks in network centrality games:
Lemma 1 (”IMPROVING SWAPS”). Let D be an open set in Rn, let x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ D and f : D → R be an analytic function. Assume 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n
are indices such that ∂f(x1,...,xn)
∂xi
> ∂f(x1,...,xn)
∂xj
. Define xi,j(ǫ) = (xk(ǫ)), with
xk(ǫ) =


xk + ǫ, if k = j,
xk − ǫ, if k = i,
xk, otherwise.
(1)
Then there exists ǫ0 > 0 such that function g : [0, ǫ0] → R, g(ǫ) = f(xi,j(ǫ)) is
monotonically decreasing.
In other words, to minimize function f one could decrease the variables with
the largest partial derivative, while symmetrically increasing a smaller one.
8There is no cost for keeping the baseline reliability.
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Proof. By the chain rule g′(0) =
n∑
k=1
∂f(x1,...,xn)
∂xk
∂xk(ǫ)
∂ǫ
|ǫ=0
=
∂f(x1, . . . , xn)
∂xj
−
∂f(x1, . . . , xn)
∂xi
< 0.
Since g′ is continuous, g′ is strictly negative on some interval [0, ǫ0]. The result
follows.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
p∗i = 0.4
p
u
i
(p
)
Figure 2: Shape of utility functions in fractional attacks.
4 Closed-form formulas
The basis for our manipulation of network centralities is the following charac-
terization of the Shapley value of the reliability extension:
Theorem 1. The Shapley values of the reliability extensions of network cen-
trality games ΓNC1 ,ΓNC2 ,ΓNC3 have the formulas:
Sh[vNC1](x) = px
∑
y∈N̂(x)
S⊆N̂(y)\x
1
|S|+ 1
Π
S,N̂(y)\x
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Sh[vNC2 ](x) = px[
∑
y∈N(x)
∑
S⊆N̂(y)\x
|S|≥k−1
(|S|+ 1− k)
|S|(|S|+ 1)
Π
S,N̂(y)\x
+
+
∑
S⊆N(x)
k
|S|+ 1
ΠS,N(x)]
Sh[vNC3 ](x) = px
∑
y∈N̂(x)
S⊆N̂cut(y)\x
1
|S|+ 1
Π
S,N̂cut(y)\x
As for credit atribution games, the corresponding result is
Theorem 2. The Shapley values of the reliability extensions of ΓFC ,ΓFO with
probabilities (p1, p2, . . . , pn) have the formulas
Sh[vFC ](x) = px ·
∑
k∈Papx
wk ·
[ ∑
S⊆Authk\{x}
Π∅,S
(nk − |S|)
(
nk
|S|
)] (2)
where Authk is the set of coauthors of paper k and nk = |Authk|, and
Sh[vFO](x) =
∑
k∈Papx
wk
nk
·ΠAuthk,Authk (3)
5 Attacking network centralities
The next result follows from Theorem 1 and Claim 1:
Corollary 1. In the reliability extensions of the centrality games ΓNC1 ,ΓNC2 ,ΓNC3 ,
the Shapley values of player 1 are monotonically decreasing functions of distance-
two neighbors’ reliabilities (and do not depend on other players).
Proof. Deferred to the full version.
The previous corollary shows that for network centrality games no removal
attack is beneficial:
Theorem 3. No removal attack on the centrality of a player in games ΓNC1 ,ΓNC2 ,ΓNC3
can decrease its Shapley value.
Fractional attacks on specific networks Given that removal attacks are
not beneficial, we now turn to fractional attacks. The objective of this section is
to show that the analysis of optimal fractional attacks is often feasible. Since the
graphs in this section are fairly symmetric, we will assume (for these examples)
that the slopes of all utility curves are identical. That is, there exist positive
constants L,R such that if i 6= j are different agents then Li = Lj = L and
Ri = Rj = R (though, of course, baseline probabilities p
∗
i and p
∗
j may differ).
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1p∗2p
∗
3
p∗4
p∗5 p
∗
6
p∗2
p∗3p
∗
4
p∗5
p∗6 p
∗
7
1
p∗3p
∗
4
p∗5
p∗6 p
∗
7
p∗3
p∗2
1p∗n
p∗n−1
Figure 3: Target topologies for fractional attacks.
The graphs we are going to be concerned with are the complete graph Kn, the
star graph Sn (where node 1 is either the center or an outer node) and the
n-cycle Cn (Figure 3).
Note that, when G = Kn or G = Sn, pairwise Shapley value attacks are
trivially impossible: indeed, these graphs have diameter at most two. Since all
distance-two neighbors influence the Shapley value of a given player, all nodes
are exempt from attacks.
On the other hand, for these topologies it turns out that the best attack on
Shapley value of player x is to increase the reliabilities of its neighbors in the
descending order of their baseline reliabilities:
Theorem 4. Let G be either the complete graph Kn with n vertices. or the
star graph with n vertices Sn centered at node x = 1. To optimally attack the
centrality of x in the reliability extension of ΓNC1 use the following algorithm:
- Consider nodes 2, . . . , n in the decreasing order of their baseline reliabili-
ties, breaking ties arbitrarily. p∗sorted(2) ≥ p
∗
sorted(3) ≥ . . . ≥ p
∗
sorted(n).
- While the budget allows it, increase to one (if not already equal to 1) the
probabilities psorted(i), starting with i = 2 and successively increasing i.
- If the budget no longer allows increasing psorted(i) to one, increase it as
much as possible.
- Leave all other probabilities to their baseline values.
If, on the other hand, G = Sn centered, say, at node 2, to optimally attack the
centrality of node x = 1, the algorithm changes as follows:
- Consider nodes 2, . . . , n in the following order: node 2, followed by nodes
3, . . . , n sorted in decreasing order of their baseline reliabilities p∗
sorted(3) ≥
. . . ≥ p∗
sorted(n), breaking ties arbitrarily. Denote the new order by Q.
- Follow the previous greedy protocol, increasing baseline probabilities up to
one (if allowed by the budget) according to the new ordering Q.
Similar statements hold for game ΓNC2 , and for ΓNC3 for large enough values
of parameter dcut.
In the previous examples the optimal attack involved a determined node
targeting order, which privileged direct neighbors and could depend on baseline
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reliabilities but was independent of the value of the budget. None of this holds
in general: as the next result shows, on graph Cn the optimum can be computed
by taking the best of four node targeting orders. The optimum may lack the
two previously discussed properties of optimal orders:
- in optimal attacks one should sometimes target a distance-two neighbor (3
or n-1) before targeting both of x = 1’s neighbors (2 and n, see Figure 3).
- the order (among the four) that characterizes the optimum may depend
on the budget value B as well. Formally:
Theorem 5. Let P,Q,R, S be the vectors [2, n, n−1, 3], [2, n−1, n, 3], [n, 3, 2, n−
1], [n, 2, 3, n− 1], respectively. Let SolP , SolQ, SolR, SolS be the configurations
obtained by increasing in turn (as much as possible, subject to the budget B) the
reliabilities of nodes 2, 3, n− 1, n in the order(s) specified by P,Q,R, S, respec-
tively. Then
a. The best of SolP , SolQ, SolR, SolS is an optimal attack on the centrality
of x = 1 in game ΓNC1 on the cycle graph Cn.
b. There exist values of p∗2, p
∗
3, p
∗
n−1, p
∗
n s.t. SolP is optimal for all values of
B (by symmetry a similar statement holds for SolS).
c. There exist values of p∗2, p
∗
3, p
∗
n−1, p
∗
n and an nonempty open interval I for
the budget B such that SolQ is an optimum for all B ∈ I (by symmetry a
similar statement holds for SolR).
6 Attacks in credit attribution
In this section we study removal attacks in credit attribution games. Interest-
ingly, while the Shapley values have identical formulas in ΓFC ,ΓFO [25], the
two games are not similar with respect to attacks. Indeed, similarly to the case
of network centrality, we have:
Theorem 6. No removal attack can decrease the Shapley value of a given player
in a full credit attribution game.
Proof. At first, this seems counterintuitive, as it would seem to contradict Ex-
ample 1. The answer is that this example does not correspond to the full credit
game, but to the full obligation one: in game ΓFC a player does not lose credit
for a paper due to removal of a coauthor; in fact its Shapley value will increase,
since the credit for the paper divides among fewer coauthors. It is in ΓFO where
players may lose credit as a result of coauthor removal.
This difference between ΓFC and ΓFO is evident with respect to attacks: As
the next result shows, in full-obligation games, finding optimal removal attacks
can simulate a well-known hard combinatorial problem:
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Theorem 7. The budgeted maximum coverage problem (which is NP-complete)
reduces to minimizing the Shapley value of a given player in the full-obligation
game (under removal attacks).
Proof. Deferred to the full version.
Fractional attacks The following is a simple consequence of the formulas
in Theorem 2 and Claim 1 shows that optimal attacks are different in games
ΓFC and ΓFO irrespective of the topology of the coauthorship hypergraph: in the
first case we need to increase the reliability of x’s coauthors, in the other case
we aim to decrease it:
Theorem 8. In the reliability extensions of the credit allocation games ΓFC ,ΓFO
the Shapley value of player x is a decreasing (respectively increasing) function
of coauthors’ reliabilities (and does not depend on other players).
Optimal attacks can be explicitly described in the particular scenario when,
just as in Example 1, each paper has exactly two authors (a situation that
corresponds, under the full obligation model, to induced subgraph games). It
turns out that the relevant quantity is the ratio between the score of coauthors’
joint contribution with the attacked node and its marginal cost:
Theorem 9. To optimally decrease the Shapley value of node x in game ΓFC
in the two-author special case:
(a). Sort the coauthors l of x in the decreasing order of the fractions C(x,l)
R(l) ,
breaking ties arbitrarily.
(b). While the budget allows it, for i = 1, . . . |CA(x)|, increase to 1 the
probability of the i’th most valuable coauthor.
(c). If the budget does not allow increasing the probability of the i’th coau-
thor up to 1, increase it as much as possible.
(d). Leave all other probabilities to their baseline values.
Corollary 2. In the setting of Theorem 9, to optimally solve the pairwise Shap-
ley value attack problem for x, y, run the algorithm in the Theorem only on those
z that are coauthors of x but not of y.
As for game ΓFO, the optimal attack is symmetric. Since we are decreasing
probabilities, we will be using fractions C(x,l)
L(l) instead:
Theorem 10. To optimally decrease the Shapley value of node x in the full
obligation game ΓFO in the two-author special case:
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(a). Sort the coauthors of x in the decreasing order of the fractions C(x,l)
L(l) ,
breaking ties arbitrarily.
(b). While the budget allows it, for i = 1, . . . |CA(x)|, decrease to 0 the
probability of the i’th most valuable coauthor.
(c). If the budget does not allow decreasing the probability of the i’th coau-
thor up to 0, decrease it as much as possible.
(d). Leave all other probabilities to their baseline values.
Corollary 3. In the setting of Theorem 10, to solve the pairwise Shapley value
attack problem for players x, y, run the algorithm in the Theorem only on those
z that are coauthors of x but not of y.
7 Proof Highlights
In this section we present some of the proofs of our results. Some other proofs
are included in the Appendix, others are deferred to the full version of the paper,
to be posted on arxiv.org:
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the formula for the first game only. Similarly to [22], the proofs for
the other two games are completely analogous, and deferred to the full version.
Define, for y ∈ V , W ⊆ V
fy(W ) =
{
1, if y 6∈W ∪ δ(W ),
0, otherwise.
A simple case analysis proves that, for everyW ⊆ V , vNC1(W∪{x})−vNC1(W ) =∑
y∈N̂(x)
fy(W ). We therefore have
Sh[vNC1 ](x) = Eπ∈Sn [vNC1(S
x
π ∪ {x})− vNC1(S
x
π)] = Eπ∈Sn [px·∑
W⊆Sxpi
[vNC1(W ∪ {x})− vNC1(W )] · ΠW,Sxpi ] = pxEπ∈Sn
∑
W⊆Sxpi∑
y∈N̂(x)
fy(W ) ·ΠW,Sxpi = pxEπ∈Sn
∑
y∈N̂(x)
∑
W⊆Sxpi
fy(W ) · ΠW,Sxpi
We now introduce two notations that will help us reinterpret the previous sum:
given W ⊆ V , denote by Alive(W ) the set of nodes in W that are alive under
the reliability extension model. Also, given permutation π ∈ Sn and W ⊆ V ,
denote by Firstπ(W ) the element of W that appears first in enumeration π.
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With these notations
Sh[vNC1 ](x) = px
∑
y∈N̂(x)
Prπ∈Sn [y /∈ Alive(S
x
π) ∪ δ(Alive(S
x
π))]
= px
∑
y∈N̂(x)
Prπ∈Sn [x = Firstπ(N̂(y) ∩ Alive(V ))|x ∈ Alive(V )]
If S = (N̂(y) \ {x}) ∩ Alive(V ) then the conditional probability that x is
Firstπ(S∪{x}), given that x is alive, is
1
|S|+1 . We thus get the desired formula.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Denote, for a set of authors C, by PapC = ∪l∈CPapl the set of papers with
at least one author in C. We decompose function vFC as vFC(·) =
∑
k wkvk(·)
where
vk(C) =
{
1, if k ∈ PapC
0, otherwise.
(4)
Thus vFC(C) =
∑
R⊆C
vFC(R)ΠR,C =
∑
R⊆C
ΠR,C
∑
k
wkvk(R) =
=
∑
k
∑
R⊆C
ΠR,Cwkvk(R) =
∑
k
wkvk(C)
which means that we can decompose vFC =
∑
k wkvk, and the Shapley value
of vFC decomposes as well Sh(vFC) =
∑
k wk · Sh(vk), and similarly for vFO.
On the other hand
Sh[vk](x) =
1
n!
∑
π∈Sn
[vk(S
x
π ∪ {x})− vk(S
x
π)]
Given set A of authors,
vk(A ∪ {x})− vk(A) =
∑
R⊆A∪{x}
vk(R)ΠR,A∪{x} −
∑
R⊆A
vk(R)ΠR,A
= (1 − px)
∑
R⊆A\x
vk(R)ΠR,A\{x} + px
∑
R⊆A\x
ΠR,Avk(R ∪ {x})
−
∑
R⊆A
ΠR,Avk(R) = px ·
∑
R⊆A
ΠR,A[vk(R ∪ {x})− vk(R)]
Now vk(R ∪ {x})− vk(R) is 1 if k ∈ Papx \ PapR, 0 otherwise. For k 6∈ Papx,
vk(A ∪ {x})− vk(A) = 0. Otherwise vk(A ∪ {x})− vk(A) = px ·
∑
R⊆A
k 6∈PapR
ΠR,A.
We can interpret this quantity as the probability that the live subset of A
does not cover k, but x is live and does. Applying this to the Shapley value we
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infer that Sh[vk](x) is the probability that in a random permutation π the live
subset of Sxπ does not cover k, but x is live and does.
Full credit model: There are nk! permutations Ξ of indices in Authk,
each of them equally likely when π is a random permutation in Sn. Given
subset S ⊂ Authk \ {x}, the probability that Ξ starts with S followed by x is
|S|!(nk−|S|−1)!
nk!
. To make x pivotal for paper k, none of the agents in S must be
live. This happens with probability Π∅,S . Given the above argument, we have
Sh[vk](x) = px ·
∑
S⊆Authk\{x}
(|S|)!(nk − |S| − 1)!
nk!
· [
∏
l∈S
(1 − pl)]
= px ·
∑
S⊆Authk\{x}
Π∅,S
(nk − |S|)
(
nk
|S|
) , hence
Sh[vFC ](x) = px ·
∑
k∈Papx
wk · [
∑
S⊆Authk\{x}
Π∅,S
(nk − |S|)
(
nk
|S|
) ] (5)
which is what we had to prove.
Full obligation model: For x to be pivotal for paper k, x and all its
coauthors in Authk must all be live, and all elements of Authk \ x must appear
before x in ordering π. This happens with probability 1
nk
·ΠAuthk,Authk .
7.3 Proof of Theorem 4
First of all, the following claim holds for all graphs G:
Claim 2. The minimum of function z → Sh[vNC1](1)|z exists and is reached
on some profile (pi) with p
∗
i ≤ pi ≤ 1.
Proof. Function z → Sh[vNC1](1)|z is continuous and the set [0, 1]
n is compact,
so the minimum is reached. Assuming some pj < p
∗
j , we could increase pj up to
p∗j , reducing total cost. This does not increase (and perhaps further decreases)
the Shapley value.
Next, we (jointly) prove cases G = Kn and G = Sn with x = 1 being a
center, since the proofs are practically identical. The remaining case (K = Sn,
x = 1 not a center) is deferred to the Appendix. We start with the following
Lemma 2. For G = Kn or G = Sn, j 6= l ∈ V (G)\1 and any probability profile
p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ (0, 1]n,
sign
(∂Sh[vNC1](1)
∂pj
|p −
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂pl
|p
)
= sign(pj − pl)
Proof. Deferred to the full version.
We first prove that in the optimal solution on these graphs no two variables
could assume equal values, unless both equal to the endpoints of their restricting
intervals:
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Lemma 3. In the setting of Theorem 4, suppose p = (p1, . . . , pn) is such there
is are indices 2 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n with 0 < pi = pj < 1. Then there exists ǫ0 > 0 such
that for every ǫ ∈ [−ǫ0, ǫ0], ǫ 6= 0, Sh[vNC1 ](1)|pi,j(ǫ) < Sh[vNC1 ](1)|p, (where
pi,j(ǫ) is defined as in equation (1)).
Proof. Deferred to the full version.
Now we prove:
Claim 3. In the optimal solution there is at most one index i1 with pi1 ∈ (p
∗
i1
, 1).
In other words, in the optimal solution some probabilities are increased up to
1, some ae left unchanged to their baseline values, and at most one variable is
increased to a value less than 1.
Proof. Suppose there were two different indices i1 6= i2. We must have pi1 = pi2 ,
or, by Lemma 1, one could decrease the Shapley value by increasing the larger
one and symmetrically decreasing the smaller one. But this is impossible, due
to Lemma 3.
Note that the greedy solution Γ has the structure from Claim 3 and that
any permutation of OPT on variables p2, . . . , pn has the same Shapley value as
OPT (since Kn, Sn have this symmetry).
We compare the vectors Γ, OPT , both sorted in decreasing order. Our goal
is to show that these sorted versions are equal. Without loss of generality, we
may assume that OPT creates the same ordering on variables as the p∗i ’s (and
Γ), when considered in decreasing sorted order (we break ties, if any, in the
same way). Indeed, if there were indices i, j such that p∗sorted(i) ≥ p
∗
sorted(j) but
psorted(i) < psorted(j) then, since psorted(j) > psorted(i) ≥ p
∗
sorted(i) ≥ p
∗
sorted(j),
we could simply swap values psorted(i) and psorted(j) and obtain another legal,
optimal solution.
If Γ were different from OPT , since Greedy increases the largest variables
first, there must be variables x, y such that Γx ≥ Γy, Γx > px and Γy < py.
Since Γ and OPT have the same ordering of variables, we also must have in fact
px ≥ py, i.e. 1 ≥ Γx > px ≥ py > Γy ≥ p∗y. But then, using either Lemma 1 (if
px 6= py) or Lemma 3 (otherwise) we could further improve OPT by increasing
px and symmetrically decreasing py, a contradiction.
7.4 Proof of Theorem 5
A simple computation shows that for G = Cn
Sh[vNC1 ](1) = p1(
p2pn + p2p3 + pn−1pn
3
−
p3 + pn−1
2
− p2 − pn + 3).
As p1 does not influence any attack on itself, w.l.o.g. we will assume p1 = 1.
We need to minimize the above quantity, subject to
p2 + p3 + pn−1 + pn = B + p
∗
2 + p
∗
3 + p
∗
n−1 + p
∗
n, p
∗
i ≤ pi ≤ 1.
We now prove a result somewhat similar to Claim 3. However, now we will only
interdict certain patterns.
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Claim 4. In an optimal solution it is not possible that p∗k < pk < 1, p
∗
l < pl < 1
when:
a. k = 2, l = n− 1 (and, symmetrically, k = 3, l = n). In fact, in this case
we have the stronger implication pn−1 > p
∗
n−1 ⇒ p2 = 1. Symetrically,
p3 > p
∗
3 ⇒ pn = 1.
b. k = 2, l = n.
c. k = 2, l = 3 (and, symmetrically, k = n, l = n − 1.) In the case when
p3+pn
3 ≤
p2
3 −
1
2 we have the stronger implication p3 > p
∗
3 ⇒ p2 = 1.
Symetrically, in the case when p2+pn−13 ≤
pn
3 −
1
2 , pn−1 > p
∗
n−1 ⇒ pn = 1.
Proof. Suppose there were two such indices k, l. We must also have
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂xk
=
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂xl
, otherwise we could decrease the Shapley value using Lemma 1. We
reason in all cases by contradiction:
a. We prove directly the stronger result. Suppose p2 < 1. We have
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂x2
= p3+pn−13 − 1 ≤
p3
3 −
2
3 <
p3
3 −
1
2 =
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂xn−1
. So we can
apply Lemma 1 to p2 and pn−1, further decreasing the Shapley value as we
increase p2 and decrease pn−1.
b. Equality of partial derivatives can be rewritten as p2 + pn = p3 + pn−1.
An easy computation (which uses this equality) shows that Sh[vNC1 ](1)|
pn,2(ǫ)
p =
− ǫ
2
3 . But then it means that one could further decrease the Shapley value of
player 1, hence we are not at an optimum, a contradiction.
c. As in the proof of a. p3+pn−p23 −
1
2 =
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂x2
−
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂x3
= 0,
otherwise we could use Lemma 1 with p2, p3 to decrease the Shapley value. An
easy computation (which uses this equality) shows that Sh[vNC1 ](1)|
p3,2(ǫ)
p =
ǫ(pn−p2+p3)
3 −
ǫ
2 −
ǫ2
3 = −
ǫ2
3 < 0. But then one could further decrease the
Shapley value of 1, a contradiction.
We use Claim 4 to prove Theorem 5:
a. The conclusion of this claim is that the only case when there could exist
two values pk, pl strictly between their baseline values and 1 is k = 3, l = n− 1
(or vice-versa), a case when we must further have p2 = pn = 1. Thus the
optimal solution is the best of the configurations obtained by greedily increasing
probabilities (up to 1, if the budget will allow it) in one of the orders [2, n, 3, n−
1], [2, n, n−1, 3], [2, n−1, n, 3], [n, 3, 2, n−1], [n, 2, 3, n−1], [n, 2, n−1, 3]. An easy
computation shows that the first two orders are equally good for all possible
budget values B, and so are the last two. So, in the end we only have to
compare the four orders P,Q,R, S to find an optimum, proving the first part of
the theorem.
b,c: Symmetry between 2,3 and n,n-1 reduces the proof of these two points
to analyzing the “winners” among SolP , SolQ, SolR, SolS , and proving that,
under suitable conditions, it belongs either to {SolP , SolS} (point b.) or to
{SolQ, SolR} (point c.).
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Perm, Sp1 sz1 Sp2 sz2 Sp3 sz3 Sp4 sz4
P 1−
p∗3+p
∗
n
3 1− p
∗
2
2−p∗n−1
3 1− p
∗
n 1/6 1− p
∗
n−1 1/6 1− p
∗
3
Q 1−
p∗3+p
∗
n
3 1− p
∗
2
1
2 −
p∗n
3 1− p
∗
n−1 1/3 1− p
∗
n 1/6 1− p
∗
3
R 1−
p∗2+p
∗
n−1
3 1− p
∗
n
1
2 −
p∗2
3 1− p
∗
3 1/3 1− p
∗
2 1/6 1− p
∗
n−1
S 1−
p∗2+p
∗
n−1
3 1− p
∗
n
2−p∗3
3 1− p
∗
2 1/6 1− p
∗
3 1/6 1− p
∗
n−1
Figure 4: Dynamics of the decrease of the Shapley value.
If we start by increasing p2 by ǫ, the Shapley value decreases by ǫ(1 −
p∗3+p
∗
n−1
3 ). We will call the number 1 −
p∗3+p
∗
n−1
3 the speed of the decrease. It
is maintained while p2 increases from p
∗
2 to 1, i.e. over a segment (interval) of
size 1− p∗2. There are four segments, corresponding to the four variables being
increased. The table in Figure 4 summarizes the effect of variable increases
on the decrease of the Shapley value of node 1. Using this table it is easy to
compare the four permutations with respect to this decrease:
P versus Q: Since they use the same variable, ∆P = ∆Q throughout the
first segment. At the (common) end of the third segment, a simple computation
yields ∆P −∆Q = 0, and since P,Q use identical fourth segments, ∆P = ∆Q
throughout their fourth segment.
As for the second/third segments, if p∗n < 1 and p
∗
n−1−p
∗
n >
1
2 then through-
out the common portion of the second segment ∆P < ∆Q. Afterwards the
difference will start shrinking, and will become positive after a certain value
λP,Q where ∆P = ∆Q. Note that at the end of the second segment of Q,
∆P −∆Q =
1−p∗n−1
6 ≥ 0, so λP,Q is in the second segment of P and the third of
Q.
To determine λP,Q write λP,Q = 1−p
∗
2+1−p
∗
n−1+µP,Q. We have:
2−p∗n−1
3 (1−
p∗n−1+µP,Q) = (
1
2−
p∗n
3 )(1−p
∗
n−1)+
µP,Q
3 , or µP,Q = p
∗
n−1−p
∗
n−
1
2 hence λP,Q =
3
2 − p
∗
2 − p
∗
n.
The conclusion is that ∆P ≥ ∆Q for all budgets if p∗n−1−p
∗
n ≤
1
2 . Otherwise
∆P ≥ ∆Q, except for B ∈ IP,Q := (1 − p∗2,
3
2 − p
∗
2 − p
∗
n). Similar conclusions
hold for comparing S versus R.
P versus S: At the (common) end of their second segment ∆P − ∆S =
(1−p∗n)(
p∗2−1
3 )+(1−p
∗
2)(
1−p∗n
3 ) = 0. So ∆P = ∆S , and this prevails throughout
the third and fourth segments.
As for the first and second segment, ∆P −∆S ≤ 0 if p∗3 + p
∗
n ≥ p
∗
2 + p
∗
n−1,
∆P − ∆S ≥ 0 if p∗3 + p
∗
n ≤ p
∗
2 + p
∗
n−1. Hence ∆P ≤ ∆S for all budgets if
p∗3 + p
∗
n ≥ p
∗
2 + p
∗
n−1. Otherwise ∆P ≥ ∆S .
Summing up:
- If p∗n−1 − p
∗
n < 1/2, p
∗
3 − p
∗
2 < 1/2, p
∗
3 + p
∗
n ≤ p
∗
2 + p
∗
n−1, then ∆P ≥ ∆Q,
∆S ≥ ∆R,∆P ≥ ∆S for all budgets, so P is optimal. If the last condition is
reversed then S is optimal.
- If p∗n−1 − p
∗
n > 1/2, p
∗
3 − p
∗
2 > 1/2 then ∆P ≤ ∆Q on IP,Q, ∆S ≤ ∆R on
IS,R. So the best of Q,R is an optimum on IP,Q∩IS,R. Since Q,R are piecewise
linear functions, one of them is better than the other one on an open interval.
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7.5 Proof sketch of Theorems 9 and 10
The two proof are very similar, so we only present the one of Theorem 9. Particu-
larizing formula 2 to the case of induced subgraph games, we infer that the Shap-
ley value of player x has the formula Sh[vFC ](x) = px ·
∑
l∈CA(x)
C(x, l) · 2−pl2 (*).
We claim that minimizing Sh[vFC ](x) is equivalent to solving the following
fractional knapsack problem:

max[
∑
l∈CA(x)
C(x, l)(1 − p∗l ) · yl]∑
l∈CA(x)
Rl(1− p
∗
l ) · yl =
∑
l∈CA(x)
Rl · (1− p
∗
l )−B.
0 ≤ yl ≤ 1, ∀l ∈ CA(x)
(6)
Indeed, by formula (*) it is only efficient to increase the reliability probabilities
of x’s authors from p∗l to some pl ∈ [p
∗
l , 1]. If we introduce variables yl ∈ [0, 1] by
equation 1−yl =
pl−p
∗
l
1−p∗
l
, (or, equivalently, yl =
1−pl
1−p∗
l
), the cost of such move is Rl·
(p∗l −pl) = Rl ·(1− yl)(1− p
∗
l ). The total costs must add up to B, so
∑
l∈CA(x)
Rl ·
(1− yl)(1 − p∗l ) = B, which is equivalent to system (6). The minimization of the
Shapley value is easily seen to correspond to the maximization of the objective
function of (6).
Now it is well-known that the greedy algorithm that considers variables
yl in decreasing order of their cost/benefit ratio finds an optimal solution to
problem (6). Reinterpreting this result in our language we get the algorithm
described in Theorem 9.
8 Related work9
First of all, network interdiction (see e.g. [37, 38]) is a well-established theme
in combinatorial optimization. Our removal model can be seen as a special case
of node interdiction.
Results on the reliability extension of a cooperative game [39, 1, 40, 41, 18]
are naturally related. So is the rich literature on manipulation, both in non-
cooperative and coalitional settings [9, 14, 11, 12, 42, 43, 13] and bribery [44]
in voting. Our framework covers both scenarios, that in which an external
perpetrator bribes agents to change their reliabilities, and that in which this is
done by a coalition of agents.
A lot of work has been devoted recently to measuring and characterizing
synergies between players in multi-agent settings [6, 45, 46]. Synergies between
players in cooperative games are obviously relevant to the theme of this paper:
synergic agents’ participation to coalitions increases the Shapley value of the
given agent. The nature of some of our results (Theorems 4, 9 and 10), that
target nodes in a fixed order, provide a concrete way for ranking synergies
between these nodes and the attacked one.
9For reasons of space this section is only sketched.
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9 Conclusions and open issues
Our results have uncovered a rich typology of optimal attacks on players’ power
indices: Sometimes no attack is beneficial. Sometimes, the optimal attack is
intractable, even when computing the power indices is feasible. For fractional
attacks, in many cases (but not always) greedy-type approaches provide an
optimal strategy.
An open question raised by our work is the complexity of fractional attacks in
general full-obligation credit attribution games. Motivated by Theorem 7 we
believe that even this version is intractable. On the other hand we would like to
see our framework applied to more settings. They include bicooperative games
[16], generalized MC-nets [26], etc. Of special interest are cases when computing
the Shapley value is easy, e.g. voting games with super-increasing weights [47],
flow games on series-parallel networks [26], or games with bounded dependency
degree [48].
As for relative attacks, we propose studying a more realistic bicriteria opti-
mization version of the problem [49]: decrease as much as possible the Shapley
value of node x while not affecting the Shapley value of node y by more than a
certain amount D.
Finally, the related problem of increasing the power index of a given node
subject to budget constraints is also worth investigating.
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Appendix
10 Proof of Corollary 1
We will actually give the following formulas for the partial derivatives of the
Shapley value:
∂Sh[vNC1](x)
∂pj
= −px
∑
y∈N̂(x)∩N̂(j)
S⊆N̂(y)\{x,j}
1
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
Π
S,N̂(y)\{x,j}
< 0.
∂Sh[vNC2 ](x)
∂pj
= −px
∑
S⊆N(x)\{j}
k
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
ΠS,N(x)\{j} − px·
∑
y∈N(x)∩N̂(j)
∑
S⊆N̂(y)\{x,j}
|S|≥k−1
[
|S|+ 2− k
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
−
|S|+ 1− k
|S|(|S|+ 1)
]Π
S,N̂(y)\{x,j}
= −px
∑
S⊆N(x)\{j}
k
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
ΠS,N(x)\{j} − px·
∑
y∈N(x)∩N̂(j)
∑
S⊆N̂(y)\{x,j}
|S|≥k−1
[
k
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
+
k − 1
|S|(|S|+ 1)
]Π
S,N̂(y)\{x,j}
which is less than zero.
∂Sh[vNC3 ](x)
∂pj
= −px
∑
y∈N̂(x)
S⊆N̂(y)\{x,j}
1
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
Π
S,N̂cut(y)\{x,j}
is less than zero (if j 6∈ B(1, 2) all derivatives are zero).
These formulas follow easily from Theorem 1, by applying the linearity of
partial derivatives and Claim 1.
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11 Proof of Lemma 2
First, for G = Kn, j 6= l distinct from x = 1 and W = V \ {1, j, l}, the formula
from the proof of Corollary 1 particularizes to:
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂pj
= −p1N
∑
S⊆V \{1,j}
1
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
ΠS,V \{1,j} = −p1N ·
[
∑
S⊆V \{1,j}
l∈S
ΠS,V \{1,j}
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
+
∑
S⊆V \{1,j}
l 6∈S
ΠS,V \{1,j}
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
] =
= −p1N [
∑
S⊆W
pl
|(|S|+ 2)(|S|+ 3)
ΠS,W +
∑
S⊆W
1− pl
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
ΠS,W ] =
= −p1N
∑
S⊆V \{x,j,l}
pl(|S|+ 1) + (1− pl)(|S|+ 3)
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)(|S|+ 3)
ΠS,W =
= −p1N
∑
S⊆W
(|S|+ 3)− 2pl
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)(|S|+ 3)
ΠS,W .
For j 6= l
∂Sh[vNC1](1)
∂pj
−
∂Sh[vNC1](1)
∂pl
= −p1N
∑
S⊆W
2(pl − pj)ΠS,W
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)(|S|+ 3)
= 2p1N(pj − pl)
∑
S⊆W
1
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)(|S|+ 3)
ΠS,W .
The sum is composed of nonnegative terms, so the difference of partial deriva-
tives has the same sign as the difference pj − pl.
For G = Sn, with 1 the center of the star, N̂(1) ∩ N̂(j) = {1, j}, so the
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particularization of the formula reads
∂Sh[vNC1](1)
∂pj
= −p1
∑
y∈{1,j}
S⊆N̂(y)\{1,j}
1
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
Π
S,N̂(y)\{1,j}
=
− p1[
1
2
Π∅,∅ +
∑
S⊆V \{1,j}
1
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
ΠS,V \{1,j}] = −p1[
1
2
+
∑
S⊆V \{1,j}
l∈S
1
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
ΠS,V \{1,j} +
∑
S⊆V \{1,j}
l 6∈S
1
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
·
· ΠS,V \{1,j}] = −p1[
1
2
+
∑
S⊆W
pl
|(|S|+ 2)(|S|+ 3)
ΠS,W+
+
∑
S⊆W
1− pl
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
ΠS,W = −p1[
1
2
+
+
∑
S⊆W
pl(|S|+ 1) + (1 − pl)(|S|+ 3)
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)(|S|+ 3)
ΠS,W = −p1[
1
2
+
+
∑
S⊆W
(|S|+ 3)− 2pl
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)(|S|+ 3)
ΠS,W
So again, for j 6= l, the sign of the difference of partial derivatives is the same
as the sign of the term pj − pl, as
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂pj
−
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂pl
= −p1
∑
S⊆W
2(pl − pj)
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)(|S|+ 3)
ΠS,W .
= 2p1(pj − pl)
∑
S⊆W
1
(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)(|S|+ 3)
ΠS,W .
12 Proof of Lemma 3
If G = Kn then
Sh[vNC1 ](1)|
p(ǫ)
p = p1N
∑
S⊆V \1
ΠS,V \1|
p(ǫ)
p
|S|+ 1
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We denoteW = V \{1, i, j}. Expanding terms corresponding to agents i, j (who
may or may not be live) and grouping we infer that
Sh[v](1)|p(ǫ)p = p1N
∑
T⊆W
ΠT,W · [
(pi + ǫ)(pj − ǫ)− pipj
|S|+ 3
+
(pi + ǫ)(1− pj + ǫ)− pi(1− pj)
|S|+ 2
+
(1− pi − ǫ)(pj − ǫ)− (1− pi)pj
|S|+ 2
+
(1− pi − ǫ)(1− pj + ǫ)− (1− pi)(1− pj)
|S|+ 1
= pxN
∑
T⊆W
ΠT,W ·
[
ǫ(pj − pi)− ǫ2
|S|+ 3
+
ǫ(1− pj + pi)) + ǫ2
|S|+ 2
+
−ǫ(1 + pj − pi)− ǫ2
|S|+ 2
+
+
ǫ(pj − pi)− ǫ2
|S|+ 1
] = p1N
∑
T⊆W
ΠT,W · [
−ǫ2
|S|+ 3
+
−ǫ2
|S|+ 1
] =
= −p1Nǫ
2
∑
T⊆W
ΠT,W · [
1
|S|+ 1
−
1
|S|+ 3
] < 0 if ǫ 6= 0.
Similarly, if G = Sn then
Sh[v](1)|p(ǫ)p = p1[
n∑
k=2
∑
S⊆{k}
ΠS,{k}|
p(ǫ)
p
|S|+ 1
+
∑
S⊆V \{1}
ΠS,V \1|
p(ǫ)
p
|S|+ 1
]
= p1[
n∑
k=2
(1−
pk
2
)|p(ǫ)p +
∑
S⊆V \{1}
ΠS,V \1|
p(ǫ)
p
|S|+ 1
]
= p1
∑
S⊆V \{1}
ΠS,V \1|
p(ǫ)
p
|S|+ 1
In the last calculation we took into account the fact that the first sum has two
nonzero difference terms, one with value ǫ/2 and one with value −ǫ/2 (corre-
sponding to k = i, j, respectively) which cancel each other. What remains is (up
to a multiplicative factor of N) identical to the difference in the case G = Kn,
and the rest of the proof is identical.
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13 Proof of Theorem 4, the case G = Sn, with
vertex 1 not being central
For G = Sn, with 2 the center of the star, N̂(1) ∩ N̂(j) = {2}, if j 6= 2,
N̂(1) ∩ N̂(2) = {1, 2}. Therefore, for j 6= 1, 2:
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂pj
= −p1
∑
S⊆N̂(2)\{1,j}
1
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
Π
S,N̂(y)\{1,j}
=
− p1
∑
S⊆V \{1,j}
1
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
ΠS,V \{1,j}
the same, within a factor of N , as the partial derivative for the case G = Kn,
while
∂Sh[vNC1](1)
∂p2
= −p1
∑
y∈{1,2}
S⊆N̂(y)\{1,2}
1
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
Π
S,N̂(y)\{1,2}
=
− p1[
1
2
+
∑
S⊆V \{1,2}
1
|(|S|+ 1)(|S|+ 2)
ΠS,V \{1,2}]
SInce
∑
S⊆V \{1,j}
ΠS,V \{1,j} = 1,
1
|(|S|+1)(|S|+2) ≤
1
2 , strictly less if S 6= ∅, and
ΠV \{1,2},V \{1,2} > 0, we infer that
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂pj
> −
1
2
, ∀j 6= 1, 2
while
∂Sh[vNC1](1)
∂p2
≤ −
1
2
Hence, by an application of Lemma 1, in the optimal solution pj > p
∗
j ⇒ p2 = 1,
in other words reliability of node 2 must be increased (to one, if the budget allows
it), before any other reliability is increased.
Invoking the result for G = Kn (Lemma 2), we infer that
sign
(∂Sh[vNC1](1)
∂pj
|p −
∂Sh[vNC1 ](1)
∂pj
|p
)
= sign(pj − pl)
Given this result, the rest of the proof is the same as in the cases G = Kn,
G = Sn with 1 in the center.
14 Proof of Theorem 7
Definition 1. The Budgeted Max-Coverage problem is specified as follows:
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- GIVEN: Universe U = {u1, u2, . . . , un}, each ui coming with a positive
integer weight wi, subsets P1, P2, . . . , Pm of U , each set Pi coming with a
positive integer cost ci, and integers k, L ≥ 1.
- TO DECIDE: Can we choose some sets such that
- the total cost of the chosen sets is at most k.
- the sum of weights of elements covered by the chosen sets is at least
L ?
Budgeted Max-Coverage is not only NP-complete, but even hard to approx-
imate [?].
We reduce an instance of Budgeted Max Coverage to the problem of mini-
mizing the Shapley value of player 1 under the full obligation model as follows:
- all players will have baseline reliabilities equal to one.
- elements will correspond to ”papers” coauthored by 1 and some other
players.
- sets will correspond to coauthors of 1, representing, for each coauthor, the
paper he coauthored together with 1. We assume that all papers of 1 are
written in collaboration.
- The cost of bringing (in a removal attack) the reliability probability of
a given player to zero is the cost of the associated set in the instance of
Weighted Max Coverage.
- the score of a paper is equal to the number of authors times the weight
of the associated element. This way, author 1 gets a contribution from a
paper in its Shapley value equal to the weight of the associated elements.
Targeting a set of players of total cost at most k will reduce the Shapley value
of player 1 by precisely the total weight of elements covered by these players.
Thus one can reduce the Shapley value of player 1 by at least L iff the answer
to the corresponding Budgeted Max Coverage problem is positive.
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